










How should Financial Intermediation 







CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 3226 









An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com 
• from the RePEc website:              www.RePEc.org 




How should Financial Intermediation 





This paper considers the optimal taxation of savings intermediation and payment services in a 
dynamic general equilibrium setting, when the government can also use consumption and 
income taxes. When payment services are used in strict proportion to final consumption, and 
the cost of intermediation services is fixed and the same across firms, the optimal taxes are 
generally indeterminate. But, when firms differ exogenously in the cost of intermediation 
services, the tax on savings intermediation should be zero. Also, when household time and 
payment services are substitutes in transactions, the optimal tax rate on payment services is 
determined by the returns to scale in the conditional demand for payment services, and is 
generally different to the optimal rate on consumption goods. In particular, with constant 
returns to scale, payment services should be untaxed. These results can be understood as 
applications of the Diamond-Mirrlees production efficiency theorem. Finally, as an extension, 
we endogenize intermediation, in the form of monitoring, and show that it may be 
oversupplied in equilibrium when banks have monopoly power, justifying a Pigouvian tax in 
this case. 
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Financial intermediation services include such important services as intermediation be-
tween borrowers and lenders, insurance, and payment services (e.g. credit and debit card
services). These services comprise a signi…cant and growing part of the national economy;
for example, …nancial intermediation services, measured using the OECD methodology1,
were 3.9% of GDP in the UK in 1970, and increased to 7.9% by 2005. The …gures for the
Eurozone countries as a whole are 2.7% to 5.5%. In the US, the …nance and insurance
sector, excluding real estate, which includes …nancial intermediation, accounted for 7.3%
of US value-added in 1999, rising to 8.4% in 20092.
The question of whether, and how, …nancial intermediation services should be taxed
is a contentious one. In the tax policy literature, it is largely assumed that within a
consumption tax system, such as a VAT, it is desirable to tax …nancial services. For
example, the European Commission has recently proposed changes to the VAT treatment
of …nancial services within the European Union, so as bring these more within the scope of
VAT (de la Feria and Lockwood (2010)). Also, the recent IMF proposals for a "bank tax"
to cover the cost of government interventions in the banking system include a Financial
Activities Tax levied on bank pro…ts and remuneration, which would work very much like
a VAT, levied using the addition method (IMF(2010)).
But, it is also recognized that there are technical di¢culties in taxing …nancial inter-
mediation when those services are not explicitly priced (so-called margin-based services),
such as the intermediation between borrowers and lenders. This raises a problem for the
use of a VAT via the usual invoice-credit method, for example (Ebril, Keen, Bodin and
Summers(2001)). As a result of this, the status quo in most countries is that a wide range
of …nancial intermediation services are not taxed3. However, conceptually, the problems
can be solved, for example, by use of a cash-‡ow VAT (Ho¤man et. al.(1987), Poddar and
English(1997), Huizinga(2002), Zee(2005)), and the increasing sophistication of banks’ IT
systems means that these solutions are also becoming practical.
So, it is increasingly relevant to ask, setting aside the technical problems, should
…nancial intermediation services supplied to households be taxed at all? And if so, at
1See http://www.euklems.net.
2See http://www.bea.gov/industry/gdpbyind_data.htm
3For example, in the EU, the Sixth VAT Directive and subsequent legislation exempts a wide range
of …nancial services from VAT, including insurance and reinsurance transactions, the granting and the
negotiation of credit, transactions concerning deposit and current accounts, payments, transfers, debts,
cheques,currency, bank notes and coins used as legal tender etc. (Council Direective 2006/112/EC of 28
November 2006, Article 135).
2what rates? Given the overall importance of …nancial services to modern economies,
there is surprisingly little written on this more fundamental question (see Section 2 for a
discussion of the literature). Moreover, we would argue that the existing literature does
not really clarify which of the fundamental principles of tax design apply. For example, is
it the case that …nancial intermediation services are intermediate goods in the production
of …nal consumption for households, and thus should not be taxed? Or, should they be
taxed at the same rate as other goods purchased on the market, at least under conditions
when a uniform consumption tax is optimal?
The objective of this paper is to address these fundamental questions4. We set up and
solve the tax design problemin a dynamic general equilibriummodel of the Chamley(1986)
type, where the government chooses taxes on payment services and savings intermediation,
as well as the usual taxes on consumption (or equivalently, wage income) and income from
capital, and where …nancial intermediaries, in the form of banks, are explicitly modelled.
On the payment services side, we assume, following the literature on the transactions cost
approach to the demand for money, that payment services are not necessarily proportional
to consumption, but can be used to economize on the household time input to trading.
This is realistic: for example, making use of a basic bank account requires a time input,
e.g. trips to the bank, but use of an additional payment service e.g. a credit card,
substitutes for trips to the bank.
We assume initially that the cost of savings intermediation per unit of capital is …xed,
but can vary across borrowers (…rms). Again, this is realistic; savings intermediation
is a complex process involving initial assessment of the borrower via e.g. credit scor-
ing, structuring and pricing the loan, and monitoring compliance with loan covenants
(Gup and Kolari(2005, chapter 9). There is evidence that other things equal, the cost of
borrowing is lower for …rms that have had longer relationships with banks (Berger and
Udell(1995)), or make information available to banks via rating agencies Brown, Jappelli
and Pagano(2009)).
We then solve the tax design problem, where the government has access to a full set
of taxes, i.e. the usual wage and capital income taxes, plus a tax on the consumption
good and on payment services, and a tax paid the bank on the spread between borrowing
and lending rates. In this set-up, there is the usual tax indeterminacy, as a uniform tax
on payment services and the consumption good is equivalent to a wage tax. We set the
wage tax equal to zero, and then show that in the general model, all remaining four taxes
4It should be noted that this paper does not deal with corrective taxes on bank lending designed to
internalize the social costs of bank failure or the costs of bailout; on this, see e.g. Keen(2010).
3are determinate i.e. there is no redundancy in tax instruments. However, under certain
restrictive conditions - in fact, those assumed by the existing literature on this topic, see
Section 2- the tax structure is indeterminate.
The tax on savings intermediation is determined as follows. In the tax design problem,
the tax on capital income is used as the "instrument" to pin down the rate of substitution
between present and future consumption for the household. So, this means that the
tax on savings intermediation is a "free instrument" that can be used to ensure that
capital is allocated e¢ciently across …rms. In turn, the cost of capital to a particular
…rm will be the cost of capital to the bank i.e. the return paid to depositors, plus the
cost of intermediation, where the latter includes any tax. So, a non-zero tax on savings
intermediation will distort the relative cost of capital across …rms, and so this tax is
optimally set to zero. This is a version of the Diamond-Mirrlees production e¢ciency
result.
Turning to the tax on the payment service, …rst, our …rst result is that the total tax
"wedge" between consumption and leisure is a weighted average of the tax on consump-
tion and on the payment service, and is determined by a standard optimal tax formula,
involving the general equilibrium expenditure elasticity of consumption (Atkeson, Chari,
and Kehoe(1999)). The sign of the tax on the payment service is itself determined5 not
by the structure of preferences, but by the returns to scale in the conditional demand for
payment services as a function of the household consumption level and time input to
transactions.
Speci…cally, with constant returns, payment services should be untaxed; this can be
understood as an instance of the Diamond-Mirrlees production e¢ciency result. More
generally, under reasonable assumptions, notably that there is a …xed element to transac-
tions costs, there are decreasing returns to scale, and in this case, it is shown that payment
services should be taxed. The intuition is somewhat similar to the Corlett-Hague rule;
with decreasing returns, the household makes positive a notional "pro…t" from the pro-
duction of the …nal consumption good using time and payment services. Given that this
pro…t cannot be taxed directly, it is optimal to tax it indirectly via taxing one of the
inputs, payment services. The general conclusion is that the tax on payment services is
determined in a completely di¤erent way to the tax on consumption, and thus will in
general be at a di¤erent rate.
Finally, in Section 5 of the paper, we consider how the savings intermediation tax
5Strictly speaking, this requires the conditional demand for payment services to be Cobb-Douglas, but
it is also likely to hold for a variety of other cases, see Section 4.
4should be designed when …nancial intermediation by banks is modelled explicitly. It
is clear that banks supply several di¤erent kinds of intermediation services6, notably
liquidity services to households (Diamond and Dybvig(1983)), and monitoring services
to …rms (Diamond (1991), Besanko and Kanatas(1993), Holmstrom and Tirole (1997)).
We argue that as long as these services are provided e¢ciently, i.e. there are no "market
failures" in provision of intermediation services, more explicit modelling of them will not
change the basic conclusions. If there are market failures, then these can be remedied by
Pigouvian taxes, but these are in addition to the optimal tax structure identi…ed in this
paper7.
We make this point by extending our model to allow for an endogenous amount of
intermediation services (per unit of savings) in the from of monitoring, along the lines
of Holmstrom and Tirole(1997)8. In their framework, without monitoring, bank lending
to …rms is impossible, because the informational rent they demand is so high that the
residual return to the bank does not cover the cost of capital. So, as monitoring is costly,
the socially e¢cient level of monitoring is that level which just induces to bank to lend.
In the case where the bank is competitive, i.e. where …rm chooses the terms of the loan
contract subject to a break-even constraint for the bank, an assumption commonly made
in the …nance literature, this is also the equilibrium level of monitoring. In this case,
savings intermediation should not be taxed, because doing to will violate production
e¢ciency, as in the case with heterogenous …rms and a …xed amount of intermediation
services per unit of savings. But, in the case where the bank is a monopolist i.e. it
chooses the contract, it will generally choose a higher level of monitoring than this, in
order to reduce the …rm’s informational rent. So, in this case, the optimal tax is a positive
Pigouvian tax, set to internalize this negative externality.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related lit-
erature. Section 3 outlines the model, and explains how existing contributions can be
viewed as special cases. Section 4 presents the main results. Section 5 studies the case of
endogenous monitoring, and Section 6 concludes.
6See Swank(1996) for an overview of the di¤ernt types of banking services.
7The same argument applies if banks engage in "gambling" with deposits ( Hellmann, Murdock and
Stiglitz(2000), Keen(2010), Miller, Zhang, and Li(2010)).
8It would, perhaps, be more natural to "endogenize" intermediation by looking at the provision of
liquidity services using Diamond-Dybvig model, which is undoubtedly the pre-eminent microeconomic
model of banking. While this is a topic for future work, the problem is that the Diamond-Dybvig model
has a three-period dynamic structure, which is very di¢cult to embed within the standard in…nite-horizon
dynamic optimal tax model. In contrast, the Holmstrom-Tirole model also describes an important aspect
of …nancial intermediation, and is essentially static, and can be embedded in this way.
52. Related Literature
There is a small literature directly addressing the of optimal taxation of borrower-lender
intermediation and payment services, Grubert and Mackie(1999), Jack(1999), Auerbach
and Gordon (2002), and Boadway and Keen(2003). Using for the most part a simple two-
period consumption-savings model, these papers broadly agree on a policy prescription9.
Given a consumption tax that is uniform across goods (at a point in time, or across
time), payment services should be taxed at this uniform rate, but savings intermediation
should be left untaxed. The argument used to establish this is simple; in a two-period
consumption-savings model with the same, exogenously …xed, tax on consumption in both
periods, this arrangement leaves the marginal rate of substitution between current and
future consumption undistorted i.e. equal to the marginal rate of transformation10.
However, one can make three criticisms of the current literature. First, even taking
their set-up as given, their optimal taxes are indeterminate. Purely mathematically,
two taxes cannot be uniquely determined from a single e¢ciency condition. Second, in
their analysis, consumption (wage) and capital income taxes are taken as given, and not
optimized by the government. Third, relative to the model of this paper, the models
analyzed in the current literature are very special in a number of respects. For example,
implicitly, these papers are assuming11 a …xed labour supply, so that a uniform tax on
consumption over the life-cycle is …rst-best e¢cient, as it does not distort the inter-
temporal allocation of consumption, and thus …nancial intermediation should not do so
either. Again, special assumptions are made about the demand for payment services, and
intermediation activities of banks. Speci…cally, they assume (i) that payment services
are consumed in proportion to consumption; (ii) that the costs of savings intermediation
are in proportion to capital invested. We are able to show that the basic result of this
literature - i.e. that intermediation taxes are indeterminate, but that an optimal tax
structure is to tax payment services at the same rate as consumption, but exempt savings
9Chia and Whalley(1999), using a computational approach, reach the rather di¤erent conclusion that
no intermediation services should be taxed, but but their model is not directly comparable to these, as
the intermediation costs are assemed to be proportional to the price of the goods being transacted.
10Auerbach and Gordon have a model that is in some respects more general, and they also take a
di¤erent analytical approach. Speci…cally, there model allows for T periods, multiple consumption goods,
and variable labour supply. In this setting, they show that a uniform tax on all commodities and payment
services is equivalent to a wage tax. Thus, they show that if a uniform commodity tax is optimal, payment
services should be taxed at the same rate, consistently with the other literature cited.
11The exception here is Auerbach and Gordon(2002), where labour supply is variable. However, in
their model, the consumption tax is just assumed to be uniform, not optimised.
6intermediation - also emerges in our model when all of these special assumptions are
made (Proposition 1 below).
A less closely related literature is that on the optimal in‡ation tax which take a trans-
action costs approach to the demand for money (Kimbrough(1986), Faig(1988), Guidotti
and Vegh(1993), Correia and Teles(1999)). In this literature, money formally plays a role
similar to payment services in our model; the main di¤erences are (i) that it is assumed
a free good i.e. it has a zero production cost, and (ii) it is subject to an in‡ation tax,
rather than a …scal tax. While (ii) makes no di¤erence from an analytical point of view,
(i) does; it turns out that when money is free, the optimal in‡ation tax is zero, as long as
the transactions demand for household time is a homogenous function of money and con-
sumption. A much more closely related …nding is in Correia and Teles (1996), where, in
Section 3 of their paper, money is allowed to have a positive production cost. Proposition
6 below can be regarded as an extension of Proposition 3 in their paper.
3. The Model
3.1. Households
The model is a version of Atkeson, Chari and Kehoe(1999) with payment services and
savings intermediation. There is a single in…nitely lived household with preferences over





(() + ()) (3.1)
where  is the level of …nal consumption in period   is the consumption of leisure,
and  is public good provision. Utilities ()() are strictly increasing and concave
in their arguments.
We take a transactions cost approach to the demand for payment services12, and
suppose that consumption  incurs a transaction cost in terms of household time, and
this cost is reduced by payment services  For example, making use of credit requires a
time input, e.g. trips to the bank, but use of an additional payment service e.g. a credit
card substitutes for trips to the bank. Then we have  = () where  is increasing
in  and decreasing in 
It turns out that for our purposes, it is convenient to describe the implicit relationship
 = () between   and  in terms of the conditional demand for payment
12This is of course, analagous to the transactions cost theory of the demand for money.
7services
 = () (3.2)
where  is increasing in  and decreasing in  We will assume that  is homogenous
of some …xed degree   0. Speci…cation (3.2) is convenient because it nests the existing
literature as a special case: this literature e¤ectively assumes  = 1 and  independent
of  i.e.  =    0. It also allows simpler tax formulae than working with
 = ()
The household thus supplies labour to the market of amount
 = 1 ¡  ¡  (3.3)
where the total endowment of time per period is set at unity. In each period  the
household also saves +1 in units of the consumption good, and deposits it with a bank,
who can then lend it on to …rms who can use it as an input to production in the next
period, after which they must repay the loan to the bank, who then in turn repays the
household. So, in this model, capital e¤ectively only lasts one period13.
Finally, in any period    are purchased by the household inclusive of taxes, and
the household also pays proportional taxes on labour and capital income. There is a
degree of indeterminacy in these tax instruments, as a uniform tax on consumption and
payment services at rate  is equivalent to a wage tax at rate 
1+. So we assume w.l.o.g.
that the wage tax on  is zero and denote the taxes on  by 

 We also assume
for convenience that one unit of the consumption good can be transformed into one unit
of payment services or one unit of the public good. Moreover, in equilibrium, payment
services are priced at marginal cost (see Section 3.3 below). This …xes the relative pre-tax
price of  and  at unity.










((1 ¡ ) + (1 + )) (3.4)
where  is the price of output in period   is the after-tax return on capital to the
household, and  is the wage. We normalize by setting 0 = 1 and assume for convenience
that 0 = 0 i.e. initial capital is zero14 Finally,  = (1 ¡ 
)  where  is the pre-tax
return on capital, determined below, and 
 is the capital income tax.
13Mathematically, this is equivalent to the usual de…nition of capital in the dynamic optimal tax model,
with a depreciation rate of 100% . But, the interpretation is slightly di¤erent - here, households do not
rent capital to …rms.
14This simpli…es the implementability constraint, and does not change anything of substance (see
Atkeson, Chari and Kehoe(1999).










((1 ¡  ¡ ) + (1 + )) (3.5)
The …rst-orderconditions fora maximumof (3.1) subject to(3.5) with respect to  +1
respectively are:

 = (1 + 





 =  (3.7)
¡(1 + 

) =  (3.8)
 = (1 + +1)+1 (3.9)
where  is the multiplier on (3.5), and we use (here and below) the notation that for
any any function  and variables    , the partial derivative of  with respect to 
is  the cross-derivative is  etc. Note that using this notation, the consumer price
of …nal consumption is  (1 + 
 + (1 + 
)) a weighted sum of the prices facing the
household of  and 
3.2. Firms
There are …rms,  = 1 Firm  produces output fromlabour and capital via the constant




 are capital and labour inputs. These
…rms are assumed to be perfectly competitive. But, they cannot purchase capital directly
from households, but must borrow from banks. Moreover, we suppose that …rms may
di¤er in intermediation costs, as described in more detail in Section 3.3 below. So, …rms
face di¤erences in the cost of capital i.e. …rm  must repay 1 + 
 per unit of capital











) = 1 + 

 (3.10)










 = 1 ¡  ¡  (3.11)
These conditions (3.10),(3.11) jointly determine  and  , given household savings and
labour supply decisions.
93.3. Banks
Banks in this economy provide two possible services. First, they can provide payment
services to the households i.e. supply  Second, they can provide intermediation be-
tween households and …rms. Banks can compete on price for both these activities (i.e.
households see the banks as perfect substitutes, both with respect to payment and in-
termediation services). We also assume no economies of scope, and constant returns in
the provision of both services, so that banks must break even on both services. Assum-
ing w.l.o.g. that the marginal and average cost of payment services is 1 in units of the
consumption good, the price of payment services will also be 1 in equilibrium.
The cost of intermediating one unit of savings between the household and …rm  is .
Note that we take  as …xed, but possibly varying between …rms, for reasons discussed in
the introduction. We also suppose that "spread" i.e. the value of intermediation services
provided by the bank, can be taxed at some rate ~ 
 In turn, the value of intermediation
services is measured by 
 ¡  where 
 is the lending rate to …rm  and  is the rate
paid to depositors. So, ^ 

 is a tax on both intermediation services provided to households,
and to …rms15. Then, as banks make zero pro…t on this activity, we must have




 ¡  ) ¡ 

















We refer to 
 as the spread tax from now on.
3.4. Discussion
The above model provides a general framework which encompasses the speci…c models of
taxation of …nancial services (Auerbach and Gordon(2002), Boadway and Keen(2003)),
Jack(1999), Grubert and Mackie(1999)) that have been developed so far. For example,
Boadway and Keen(2003)), Jack(1999), Grubert and Mackie(1999) are two-period versions
of the above model16, with (implicitly) …xed labour supply. Auerbach and Gordon(2002)
is a …nite-horizon version of the model, with the additional feature17 that there are 
15In principle, one could allow for the intermediation services received by these two parties to be taxed
at di¤erent rates, but in practice, this is very di¢cult to implement (Poddar and English(1997)).
16A minor quali…cation here is that Boadway and Keen allow for a …xed cost of savings intermediation
e.g. …xed costs of opening a savings account. These introduce a non-convexity into household decision-
making, which greatly complicates the optimal tax problem, and so we abstract from these in this paper.
17It also has labour supply in only one period.
10consumption goods in each period, a feature that, however, is inessential in the sense
that the main results of this paper generalize straightforwardly to  consumption goods
in each period (see Section 5 below).
As already noted in Section 2, the feature of all these contributions, however, is the
special assumptions they implicitly make about demand for payment services and bank
intermediation. On the household side, they all assume, …rst, that payment services are
needed in …xed proportion to consumption and that (implicitly) that a time input  is
not required from the household. In our model, this amounts to the assumptions that
() =  in (3.2), in which case, choosing the constant to be unity,  =  On
banking activity, the existing literature assumes that the cost of intermediation in …xed
proportion to household savings. In the context of our model, this requires  =  i.e.
…rms are all the same with respect to intermediation costs, or - equivalently - there is
only one …rm.
Finally, the relation of our model to the optimal in‡ation tax literature is as fol-
lows. Our modelling of household demand for intermediation services is closely related
to the "transactions cost" view of the demand for money in that literature (Corriea and
Teles(1996), (1999)). In particular, if we de…ne  as real money balances, their trans-
actions cost function is and inversion of (3.2) to obtain  as a function of ; then,
increased real money balances reduce the labour transactions costs of consumption. The
models in this literature do not allow for physical capital or taxation of capital income,
or costly money, and so in this sense are more special. Nevertheless, one of our results,
Proposition 3 below, is related to that literature, especially Proposition 2 of Correia and
Teles(1996).
3.5. A Benchmark Indeterminacy Result
Now we make the assumptions of the existing literature (Auerbach and Gordon(2002),
Boadway and Keen(2003)), Jack(1999), Grubert and Mackie(1999)), namely: (i) that
conditional demand for  is independent of  and linear in  i.e.  = ; (ii) only one
type of …rm; and (iii) a …xed consumption tax 
 and a zero capital income tax 
 = 0.
Under these assumptions, we show that optimal taxes on …nancial intermediation are
generally indeterminate. Note from (3.6)-(3.9) that given (i) i.e.  = 1 and 






 + (1 + 
)
1 + 




  = 1 (3.14)
11Moreover, from (3.10), (3.13), given only one …rm:
 =  ¡ 1 ¡ (1 + 

)  = 1 (3.15)





 + (1 + 
)
1 + 
¡1 + (1 + 
¡1)
1
 ¡ (1 + 
)
  = 1 (3.16)
Now say that the sequence f

g1
=0 is a restricted optimal tax structure on …nancial
services if the inter-temporal allocation of consumption is left undistorted by taxes. From
(3.16), this requires:
1 + 
 + (1 + 
)
1 + 









  = 1 (3.17)




uniquely determined from (3.17) i.e. there is indeterminacy in the restricted optimal tax




has the advantage that it is optimal, independently of knowledge of  and is thus
administratively convenient. We can thus summarize:
Proposition 1. In the benchmark case, with (i) conditional demand for  independent
of  and linear in ; (ii) only one type of …rm; and (iii) a …xed consumption tax 
 and
zero capital income tax 
 = 0 then the restricted optimal tax structure on …nancial
services is not uniquely determined. But, a uniform tax on goods and payment services
(
 = 
) and a zero tax on the spread (
 = 0) is an administratively convenient
restricted optimal tax structure.
This result summarizes the …ndings of the existing literature, in the context of our
model. It is important to emphasize that under the assumptions made by the existing
literature, optimal taxes on …nancial intermediation are in fact indeterminate. This main
purpose of this paper is to relax these assumptions in an empirically plausible way, and
at the same time generate determinacy in the tax structure.
4. Tax Design
We take a primal approach to the tax design problem. In this approach, a policy








=0 to maximize utility (3.1) subject to the capital and labour
12market clearing conditions (3.11), aggregate resource, and implementability constraints.
We are thus assuming, following Chamley(1986), that the government can pre-commit to
policy at  = 0 The aggregate resource constraint says that total production must equal
to the sum of the uses to which that production is put:














)  = 01 (4.1)
The implementability constraint ensures that the government’s choices also solve the
household optimization problem. First, using the fact from (3.2) that  has constant
returns of degree   we have:









 + (1 + 

)) + (1 + 












) + (1 + )
¶





( ¡ ((1 ¡ ) + )) = 0 (4.4)







is the notional "pro…t", in units of leisure, that the household makes from the activity of
combining  and  to "produce"  Note as   0   0 i¤ there are decreasing
returns to scale in the conditional demand for  i.e.   1
So, following the primal approach, we can de…ne the social welfare function
 = () + () + ( ¡ (1 ¡  + )) (4.6)
where  ¸ 0 measures the cost of distortionary taxation. The government’s choice of
primal variables must maximize
P1
=0 
 subject to (4.1) and (4.4). The …rst-order
13conditions with respect to   are, respectively;









 +  (4.9)


 = ¡1 (4.10)

















 are the multipliers on the resource, capital market, and labour market
conditions at time  respectively.
Moreover, from (4.6),
 = (1 + (1 + )) (4.14)
 =
¡(1 ¡  ¡ ) ¡ 

and
 =  (1 + (1 + )) (4.15)
 =
 ¡ (1 ¡  + ) ¡ 

So,  is what Atkeson, Chari and Kehoe(1999) call the general equilibrium expenditure
elasticity. Note that if there are constant returns to scale, i.e.  = 1  ´ 0 and so
 are reduce to standard formulae found, for example, in the primal approach to
the static tax design problem (Atkinson and Stliglitz(1980)).
We begin by characterizing the overall tax on …nal consumption, which from (3.6) is




 We can then state (all proofs in Appendix):




















Note that (4.16) is a formula for an optimal consumption tax that also occurs in the
static optimal tax problem, when the primal approach is used (Atkinson and Stiglitz(1980,
p377). In particular,  is the marginal bene…t of $1 to the government, and  is a
measure of the marginal utility of $1 to the household, so
¡
 is a measure of the
14social gain from additional taxation at the margin. But, inspection of (4.14) and (4.15)
reveals that in our analysis, the  are generally di¤erent to the static case, unless
 = 0 which occurs when there are constant returns in the conditional demand for
payment services,  = 1 Note also that the optimal tax 
 +
 on …nal consumption is
a weighted average of two taxes on marketed goods,  and  and thus these two separate
taxes are not yet determinate.
The next result characterizes 
 and can be stated as follows18:
Proposition 3. If household demand for payment services depends on the time input


















is the marginal e¤ect of  on household pro…t (4.5). But, if conditional demand for
payment services is independent of the time input ( = 0) then the optimal tax on
payment services is indeterminate.
That is, generally, 
 is determinate, but under the special conditions of the existing
literature, when  = 0 it is not. What can we say about the structure of optimal taxes
in that special case? From (4.16), there are an in…nite number of combinations of 


that can be optimal. But, it is also clear from (4.16) that a total ad valorem tax on …nal
consumption some percentage rate can be implemented by 
 and 
 set at the same
percentage rate This of course echoes Proposition 1, but is in fact a generalization of it,
because we are considering the full, not the restricted, optimal tax problem.
Turning to the main case of interest, when 
 is determinate, we see that it is not
general equal to 
 but is instead determined by the e¤ect of  on the the notional
"pro…t" of the household,  Speci…cally, the sign of 
 is the sign of ¡ One intuition
for this is as follows. If the government imposes a positive tax on  this will cause a
reduction in  and at a …xed level of consumption,  a compensating increase in 
If this decreases notional pro…t for the household, which is not directly taxable, this is
18As noted in Section 2, Proposition 3 is related to Proposition 2 of Corriea and Teles(1996). They
consider what is formally a very similar tax design problem. The main di¤erences are; (i) Proposition 6
extends their analysis by providing an explicit formula for the optimal tax rate, and characterizing the
case where there are no labour transactions costs associated with consumption; (ii) they work with a
di¤erent speci…cation of (3.2), namely where  is the dependent variable.
15desirable. But this last e¤ect is measured just by ¡ Note that in the special case of
constant returns,  = 1 
 = 0 This can be understood as an instance of the Diamond-
Mirrlees Theorem; if household "pro…t" is zero, the intermediate good, payment services,
should not be taxed.
More generally, there is an analogy here with the Corlett-Hague rule, which says that
goods complementary with non-taxable leisure should be taxed more heavily. An analogy
can also be drawn with tax design when there are non-constant returns to scale in the
production of marketed goods. In that case, it has long been known that in this situation,
a deviation from aggregate production e¢ciency (non-taxation of intermediate goods) is
optimal. For example, Stiglitz and Dasgupta(1971) show that factors of production should
be taxed more heavily when used in industries where pure rent is positive and cannot be
taxed at 100%. Here, the principle is similar: the factor of production,  should be
taxed (subsidized), if it causes - indirectly, via  - pro…t to rise (fall).
We can now focus on the determinants of the sign of  We can start with the Cobb-
Douglas case where (3.2), () = +¡  ¸ 0   0 Then,

()2 = 1
 + 1 so that











so that sign of 
 is determined by the returns to scale in conditional demand. In
particular, if there are decreasing returns to scale, which is the plausible case, then 
 is
positive. However, it is possible for

()2 ¡ 1 to be negative, for example, if () =
ln(). Then

()2 ¡ 1 = ln() ¡ 1 which could be negative for small enough
 So, the sign of the optimal payment tax is not always positive when there are decreasing
returns in 
We now turn to the tax on capital income and the spread tax. Then, we have:




















  = 1 (4.20)
where  =
1+
1+(1+) So, if …rms are homogenous in intermediation costs, ( =  all
) then 
 
 are not uniquely determined, but if there is heterogeneity ( 6=  some
) then the unique solution to the system (4.20) has 
 = 0 and in the steady state, 
 =
0
So, we see that as long as intermediation costs di¤er across …rms, the spread tax 

at any date should be zero. The intuition for this result is clear. From (4.12), (4.10), we














That is, the marginal product of capital net of true intermediation costs should be equal
across …rms, which of course is just the condition for capital to be allocated e¢ciently
across …rms. But, condition (4.21) is generally not consistent with a non-zero spread tax
when …rms are heterogenous, as then from (3.10), (3.13),














(421) cannot hold. This is just an instance of the Diamond-Mirrlees
production e¢ciency theorem. A tax on the spread is an intermediate tax on the allocation
of capital, and given our assumptions (a full set of tax instruments, and no pure pro…ts),
this tax should be set to zero. Note also that when there is only one …rm, this argument
has no bite, and thus  is left indeterminate.
Finally, we see that in the steady state, 
 = 0 So, the celebrated result of Cham-
ley(1986) that in the steady state, the tax on capital income is zero continues to hold
in our setting. In this sense, the optimal structure of wage and capital income taxes is
separable from the optimal tax on borrower-lender intermediation.
5. Endogenizing Intermediation Services
We have, so far, treated the service of savings intermediation by banks in rather "black
box" fashion. In particular, we have treated  the amount of intermediation services
per unit of capital, as exogenous. However, it is clear that banks supply several di¤erent
kinds of intermediation services19, notably liquidity services (Diamond and Dybvig(1983)),
and monitoring services (Diamond (1991), Besanko and Kanatas(1993), Holmstrom and
Tirole (1997)). In this section, we present a simple version of Holmstrom and Tirole
(1997), where the role of banks is endogenous. Banks provide monitoring services, which
enables them to reduce the informational rent of the …rms to which they lend, and thus
overcome the "credit rationing problem"20 which prevents …rms borrowing directly from
households. Thus, in terms of the baseline model, we essentially endogenize  the level
19See Swank(1996) for an overview of the di¤ernt types of banking services.
20The credit rationing problem arises when the informational rent demanded by borrowers in ex-
change for "behaving" is so high that the residual return to the bank does not cover its cost of capi-
tal(Tirole(2006)).
17of intermediation services provided per unit of capital intermediated. This micro-founded
"sub-model" is then embedded in the general equilibrium model21, which allows us to solve
for the optimal tax on the spread,  We …nd that when the bank is "competitive" i.e.
…rms set the terms of the loan contract,  = 0 but that when the bank is a monopolist,
 is strictly positive.
The details are as follows (in what follows,we drop time subscripts except where nec-
essary). First, we drop payment services from the model, by setting  =  = 0 We
then assume that there are two kinds of …rms, a non-entrepreneurial …rm (NE-…rm), and
a continuum of unit measure of entrepreneurial …rms (E-…rms). The NE-…rm has a linear
production function () =  + (1 + ) Moreover, the NE-…rm does not require
bank intermediation, but can rent capital directly from the household. Given this linear
production function, the cost of capital is determined independently of the capital stock
at 1 + , and thus we require ( + ) = 1 to ensure a steady state (Atkeson, Chari and
Kehoe(1999)) If this holds, then the economy converges immediately to the steady state.
Each E-…rm operates as follows. In any period  it has a discrete investment project,
which requires one unit of capital. The E-…rmmust borrowall of this; it has no collateral22.
If the project is a success, it produces  units of output at +1, and if it fails, it produces
0. Let ~  be the random output of the project, assumed uncorrelated across E-…rms.
Following Holmstrom and Tirole(1997), Section 4.4, we model monitoring by supposing
that there are two versions of the project that can be chosen by the …rm: a good version,
where the probability of success is 1    0; and a bad version, where the probability
of success is 0   =  ¡ ¢ but there is a private bene…t () for the E-…rm, where
() is further discussed below.
There is now a single bank, who lends to all the E-…rms. The bank, as well as the
E-…rm, can observe ~  Moreover, the bank has access to a monitoring technology, which
operates as follows. If operated at intensity  the bank can prevent the …rm undertaking
a bad project with payo¤ greater than () with (0)  0 0  0 00  0 This can be
interpreted, for example, as the extent to which the bank can detect whether the …rm is
conforming with the covenants of its loan contract. As in Holmstrom and Tirole(1997),
21It goes without saying that combining an agency model of banks with a dynamic tax design problem
is a challenging exercise, and so we work with the simplest possible model of endogenous intermediation
that we can formulate. In particular, we chose the Holmstrom-Tirole model to make our point because
it seemed (to us) that it was not possible to embed the Diamond-Dybvig model in our dynamic model of
optimal tax in a tractable way.
22This is in contrast to Holmstrom and Tirole, where the distribution of collateral across …rms plays a
central role.
18we assume that only the good project is economically viable, even taking into account the
maximum bene…t (0) for the E-…rm i.e.
 ¡ (1 + )  0   ¡ (1 + ) + (0) (5.1)
Following Holmstrom and Tirole(1997), section 4.4, we de…ne a loan contract between
the bank and the …rm to be a repayment  from the …rm to the bank, conditional on
stochastic output ~ , with the …rm retaining  = ~  ¡  plus a level of monitoring,
 In the design of this contract, we assume limited liability, which means both payments
 have to be non-negative. So, limited liability means that contract speci…es  =
 = 0 whenever output is zero.
The usual approach in the …nancial contracting literature is to study the optimal
contract between the bank and the …rm where the …rm has all the "bargaining power"
i.e. the bank is a passive entity which must simply make non-negative expected pro…t
(Holmstrom and Tirole(1997), Tirole(2006)). We begin with this case as a benchmark,
assuming that …rms are risk-neutral, i.e. that they maximize expected pro…ts23.
From (5.1), the optimal contract must induce the …rm to choose the good project i.e.
it must satisfy the incentive constraint




It must also give the bank non-negative expected pro…t24. Generally, the pro…t of the
bank can be written
¦
(
) = (1 ¡ 
)(( ¡ ) ¡ (1 + )) ¡  (5.3)
This is because (¡)¡(1+) is the expected margin on the loan, or spread, which
is taxed at rate , so (5.3) is of the same general form as (3.12) above Assume for the
moment that  = 0. Then the pro…t constraint of the …rm is
¦
(0) = ( ¡ ) ¡ (1 + ) ¡  ¸ 0 (5.4)
The loan contract problem for the …rm is then to choose  to maximize  subject
to (5.2), (5.4). These constraints reduce to
 ¡ (1 + ) ¡  ¸  ¸ () (5.5)
23This can be justi…ed as follows. There are a large number (a continuum) of …rms, owned by the
household, and because success probabilities are assumed uncorrelated, aggregate pro…t is non-stochastic
and equal to the expected pro…t of a typical …rm; so, the household prefers aggregate pro…t to be
maximised.
24By the same aergument as in the previous footnote, we can assume that banks maximise expected
pro…t.
19Now assume:
A1. ( ¡ (0))  (1 + ) max f( ¡ ()) ¡ g  (1 + )
Assumption A1 is illustrated in Figure 1 below; note that ( ¡ (0)) is concave
as shown, because 00  0
Figure 1 in here
The interpretation of A1 is as follows. The …rst inequality in A1 implies that without
monitoring, lending to E-…rms is impossible, because the informational rent they demand
is so high that the residual return to the bank does not cover the cost of capital. In
that case, we have credit rationing, in the terminology of Tirole (2006), Chapter 3. The
second inequality in A1 ensures that, absent taxation, the credit rationing problem can
be overcome by appropriate choice of monitoring.
So, from A1, (5.5) is violated at  = 0 but holds for  above a certain minimum
level. So, it is clear that it is optimal for the …rm to reduce  to the point where these
inequalities just hold i.e. to  =  where  is the smallest root of
( ¡ ()) ¡  = (1 + )
as shown in Figure 1. Note that this is in fact the socially e¢cient level of monitoring;
monitoring is costly, and so it is optimal to set it just at the point where the bank is
willing to lend, and no higher.
What happens when the bank has all the bargaining however in designing the loan
contract? Now the bank chooses  to maximize (5.3) subject to (5.2). Clearly, (5.2)
will be binding, so substituting  = () into (5.3) and maximizing with respect to




() = 1 =)  = 
¤(
) (5.6)
for any …xed tax  Now from Figure 1, it is clear that ¤(0)   i.e. without a tax, the
bank "over-monitors" in order to reduce the informational rent of the E-…rm. From (5.6),
it is also clear that a tax  can be found which will make ¤() =  But, at this tax,





) = (1 ¡ 
)(( ¡ ()) ¡ (1 + )) ¡  
( ¡ ()) ¡ (1 + ) ¡  = 0
20So, the best that the government can do it is to increase  to the value ~  at which
max ¦(~ ) = 0; generally, 0  ~   , implying a level of monitoring ~  = ¤(~ ) 
 as shown on Figure 125. Thus, ~  is a constrained Pigouvian tax; it corrects over-
monitoring as far as is possible while respecting the break-even constraint of the bank.
So far, we have considered the problem of choosing 
 in isolation. The full optimal
tax problem is then as follows. The government chooses the primal variables, now in-
cluding  i.e. f+1g
1
=0 to maximize utility (3.1) subject to the resource and
implementability constraints, and the constraint that  must be achievable, given the tax
instrument 
. Assuming the government can set a 100% pro…t tax on both the bank and




( ¡ (1 ¡ )) = 0 (5.7)
Given the above analysis, the aggregate resource constraint says that total production
must equal to the sum of the uses to which that production is put, given the control that
the government has over . Using the fact that () = (1¡)+(1+) and that
lending to E-…rms occurs i¤  ¸ ~  we can write this constraint as
 + +1 +  +  =
(
(1 ¡ ) + (1 + )( ¡ 1) +   ¸ ~ 
(1 ¡ ) + (1 + )   ~ 
 = 01 (5.8)
where ~  =  when the …rm chooses the loan contract, and ~  = ¤(~ ) when the bank
chooses the loan contract. Note that in (5.8), output increases by  ¡ (1 + )  0 if
E-…rms are …nanced, but a cost ~  must be incurred.
So, following the primal approach, we can de…ne the social welfare function
 = () + () + ( ¡ (1 ¡ ))
where   0 as long as the tax on pro…ts is insu¢cient to fund the cost of the public good,




25Note that max ¦(~ ) = 0 at the point where the function ( ¡ ()) ¡ (1¡ ~ ) is tangent
to 1 + ; this curve is shown as the bold dotted line in Figure 1.
26Unlike in the baseline model, both bank and E-…rm can make positive pro…ts, with the bank making
max¦() and the E-…rm making ¦ = . But, if these are taxed at 100%, the household has no
non-wage income, and thus the implementability constraint is the usual one.
21to (5.8). The …rst-order conditions with respect to  are, respectively;

 =  (5.9)

 =  (5.10)
¡¡1 + (1 + ) = 0 (5.11)

 =  (5.12)
where  is the multiplier on (5.8). As convergence to the steady state is immediate from
 = 1 onwards,   are independent of  implying  = ¡1 so (5.11) holds
by assumption of (1 + ) = 1 Also, the optimal choice of  is;
 =
(
~  i¤  ¡ (1 + ) ¡ ~  ¸ 0
0 otherwise
The optimal tax structure can now be characterized as follows. First, let
 =
¡(1 ¡ ) ¡ 

  =
 ¡ (1 ¡ ) ¡ 

Then we have:
Proposition 5. Assume A1. Then, at every date  the optimal consumption tax  is
given by













and the optimal tax on capital income is  = 0 The optimal spread tax  is as follows.
If the E-…rm chooses the loan contract,  = 0 But, if the bank chooses the loan contract,
 = ~   0 In both cases, in equilibrium, the bank always loans to the E-…rms.
So, the properties of the consumption and capital income tax are the same as in the
base case i.e. as in Propositions 2 and 4, taking into account the simpli…cations made
elsewhere in the model in this Section. The main question of interest is how  is set.
In the case where the bank is "competitive",  = 0 This is because if the bank is
competitive, it is supplying the e¢cient level of monitoring,  and imposition of a tax
will distort this;  will have to rise from its e¢cient level to compensate the bank and make
it just willing to lend. If, on the other hand, the bank is a monopolist, it "over-monitors"
in order to reduce the informational rent of the E-…rm, above the minimum level . This
imposes a negative externality on the E-…rm, and so  is a Pigouvian tax which ensures
that the bank internalizes the negative externality, subject to respecting the zero pro…t
constraint.
226. Conclusions
This paper has considered the optimal taxation of two types of …nancial intermediation
services (savings intermediation, and payment services) in a dynamic economy, when the
government can also use wage and capital income taxes. When payment services are used
in strict proportion to …nal consumption, and the cost of intermediation services is the
same across …rms, the optimal taxes on …nancial intermediation are generally indetermi-
nate. But, when …rms di¤er in the cost of intermediation services, the tax on savings
intermediation should be zero. Also, when household time and payment services are sub-
stitutes in household "production" of …nal consumption, the optimal tax rate on payment
services is determinate, and is generally di¤erent to the optimal rate on consumption
goods. Finally, as an extension, we endogenized the cost of intermediation, and showed
that intermediation services (monitoring) may be oversupplied in equilibrium when banks
have monopoly power, justifying a Pigouvian tax in this case.
There are two obvious limitations of the analysis. The …rst is that the government
is assumed to be able to precommit to a tax policy at time zero. However, even in
a simpler setting without a banking sector, the characterization of the optimal time-
consistent capital and labour taxes is a technically demanding exercise (see e.g. Phelan
and Stacchetti (2001)) and so such an extension is certainly beyond the scope of this
paper.
The second is the restriction to linear income taxation. The classic result of Atkin-
son and Stiglitz tells us that with non-linear income taxation, commodity taxation is
redundant, and more recently, Golosov et. al. (2003) has recently shown that this result
generalizes to a dynamic economy. Their result would apply, for example, in a version of
our model where households di¤er in skill levels, and without any …nancial intermedia-
tion. What would happen if we introduced …nancial intermediation in this environment?
The results on taxation of payment services seem likely to be a¤ected, as the government
has additional degrees of freedom with which to tax the notional "pro…t" from household
production.
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25A. Appendix
A.1. Proofs of Propositions






1 + (1 + )























1 + (1 + )
(A.3)
Also, from (4.8),(4.11),(4.13),(3.10) we have:
(1 + (1 + )) = 










Combining (A.3),(A.4) to eliminate  and rearranging, we get (4.16) as required. ¤














































































Next, using (3.6), (3.9),  = (1 ¡ 
) and (3.13), we get:
¡1
















Combining (A.9), A.10), and eliminating 
+1 we get that:
¡
















)  = 1 (A.11)
Finally, using (A.8) to substitute 
 ¡  by
¡1
 in (A.11), we get (4.20) as required.
If  = 1 (4.20) is a single condition and thus 

 are not uniquely determined. If








 ¡1  
 = 0 is the unique solution to this system. So,  = 0 is a solution
in the steady state. ¤
Proof of Proposition 5. The …rst two parts of the proposition can be proved along
the lines of Propositions 2 and 4. To prove the last part, all we have to prove is that the
government wishes to induce lending by the bank i.e. from (5.8) that
 ¡ (1 + ) ¡ ~  ¸ 0
This condition is most stringent when ~  = ¤(~ ) But, giventhe de…nitions of ¦( ~ )¤(~ )
we see that
 ¡ (1 + ) ¡ ~   (1 ¡ ~ 










So,  = ~  must be optimal. It then follows from the discussion in the text that the
government must set  = 0 if the E-…rm chooses the loan contract, and  = ~  if the
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